On Completion Leases: A New Exception to the Rule Against Perpetuities by unknown
ON COMPLETION LEASES: A NEW EXCEPTION
TO THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES?
Wong v. DiGrazia
60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d 817, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1963).
Defendants agreed to construct and lease a building to the plaintiffs
for a period of ten years, the term to commence on completion of the
building. Plaintiffs sought to rescind the lease, contending that it was in
violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities.1 The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia affirmed a judgment for defendants on their cross-claim alleging
plaintiff's breach, holding that the Rule Against Perpetuities was not vio-
lated. The court reasoned that although the lease designated no certain
completion date for the building, the use of such terms as "forthwith"
and "continue expeditiously" in the agreement indicated an obligation to
complete construction within a reasonable time. Since, under the circum-
stances, a reasonable time was considered to be less than twenty-one years,
the term would vest or fail within the period of the Rule and the interest
was therefore held valid. 2
The Rule Against Perpetuities was developed to curb the inalien-
ability created by the executory interest 3 and to prevent the withdrawal
of property from the market place via family settlements.4 The application
of the Rule moved precariously from gift transactions into the commercial
area5 when the Rule was used to invalidate an option to purchase land in
the late nineteenth century.6 Since then the courts have been faced with
the task of determining the extent of the application of the Rule in the
commercial area.7
1 The action was originally brought to determine if defendant had breached by
refusing to install a sprinkler system. The perpetuities issue was first raised in oral
argument before the district court of appeal, which held the lease to be in violation
of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Wong v. DiGrazia, 29 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Ct. App. 1963).
2 Wong v. DiGrazia, 60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d 817, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1963).
California has codified the Rule: "No interest in real or personal property shall be
good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being
at the creation of the interest .... " Cal. Civ. Code § 7152.
8 3 Simes & Smith, Future Interests § 1232 (2d ed. 1956).
4 Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror," 65
Harv. L. Rev. 721, 736 (1952).
5 Leach, "Perpetuities: New Absurdity, Judicial and Statutory Correctives," 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1322 (1960).
6 6 American Law of Property § 24.56 (Casner ed. 1952).
7 3 Simes & Smith op. cit. supra note 3, § 1243; (Rule not applicable to options
to renew leases), id. § 1244; (applicable to options in gross to purchase land), id.
§ 1246; (not applicable to covenants running with the land), Warner & Swasey Co.
v. Rusterholtz, 41 F. Supp. 498 (D. Minn 1941); (not applicable to options to pur-
chase corporate stock), Restatement, Property § 400 (1944). But see 3 Simes &
Smith, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1246.
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All of the cases dealing with "on completion" leases have assumed
that, because there is a contingent interest, the Rule must be considered.
In Haggerty v. City of Oakland 8 it was held that there was a possibility
that the building might not be completed within the twenty-one year period
and the lease was invalidated. The court refused to construct a requirement
of reasonableness, stating that the argument was deceptively simple and
unsound.9 In Isen v. Giant Food, Inc.,10 a federal court took a new tack;
it held that the language in the instrument gave the lessee a vested interest
in a future term and, since the interest was vested, the Rule was inappli-
cable." The rationale used by some courts to avoid the Rule's operation is
that the lessee acquires an interesse termini, which is more than a mere
right of entry; it is an estate in the land, a vested interest with enjoyment
postponed.1 2 At common law the concepts of vested or contingent did not
apply to the interesse termini 13 and Gray, who treats the interest like an
estate, asserts that a future term without any subsisting intermediate term
would not be a vested interest for purposes of the Rule.14 Nevertheless, it
has been urged that the interest should be accepted as vested because such
acceptance provides a device which enables courts to avoid the perpetuities
issue.15 Such illogical reasoning is a costly means of avoiding the issue: if
the interest were a fee rather than a leasehold and the appropriate language,
"to B and his heirs on completion of the building," were used, then an
executory interest clearly subject to the Rule would have been created.
A classification of interests subject to the Rule should not be based on the
quality or quantity of the interest, nor on the manipulation of such a nebu-
lous term as "vest."' 6 Regardless of how the language of an "on comple-
tion" lease is employed, possession is still subject to a condition precedent
8 161 Cal. App. 2d 407, 326 P.2d 957 (1958).
9 Id. at 420, 326 P2d at 966. For a criticism of the case see 47 Calif. L. Rev.
197 (1959) ; 10 Hastings LJ. 439 (1959) ; Leach, supra note 5, at 1318.
10 295 F2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
11 "Landlord does hereby lease and demise unto the Tenant [the property]
together with the building to be constructed," id. at 138. The language in the
lease in the present case was, "Lessor [defendants] shall forthwith commence the
construction of a building upon the herein demised premises .... ." Wong v. DiGrazia,
supra note 2, at 528, 386 P.2d at 820, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 244. (Emphasis supplied.) A
present demise for a duration of ten years after the completion of the building with
the rent postponed until completion should be sufficient language to categorize the
interest as "vested." Leach, supra note 5, at 1321. Using language of present demise
with possession subject to a condition precedent, however, is inconsistent and does
confuse the issues.
12 See Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 733, 736 (1959); Benjamin v. Northwestern Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 119 Minn. 27, 137 N.W. 183 (1912) ; DePauw Univ. v. United Elec.
Coal Co's., 299 Ill. App. 339, 20 N.E2d 146 (1939) ; Reichman v. Drake, 89 Ohio App.
222, 100 N.E.2d 533 (1951).
13 3 Simes & Smith, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1242.
14 Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 320.1 (4th ed. 1942).
15 37 Notre Dame Law. 561 (1962).
16 Schuyler, "Should The Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?" 56 MicI.
L. Rev. 683, 708 (1958).
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-- completion of the building-and the perpetuities issue should be
confronted.
Gray stated that "every provision in a will or settlement is to be
construed as if the Rule did not exist, and then to the provision so con-
strued the Rule is to be remorselessly applied."' 7 The conception of proper
construction under this formula can range from merely interpreting the
words used and assessing remote possibilities to actually imposing con-
ditions and validating indefinite transactions. The majority in the instant
case prefers the more active role of construction, while the dissent argues
for the passive interpretation of possibilities reminiscent of such atrocities
as the fertile octogenarian and the unborn widow. The area of wills and
trusts is amenable to this passive interpretation, but when the validity of
a lease is challenged the rules of construction relating to contracts should
be given an opportunity to solve the perpetuities problem.18 Assume, for
example, that plaintiff brings an action for damages for defendant's breach
in failing to construct the building twenty years after the creation of the
interest. The court must then construe the agreement to ascertain the intent
of the parties concerning the time for completion and, if no time was
stipulated, it will be assumed that the parties intended completion within
a reasonable time. The court must then decide whether this reasonable
time is less than twenty years. This construction was made without regard
to the Rule and would satisfy Gray's formula should the Rule be later
applied to the construction.
In the principal case the plaintiffs conceded that the court could
construct a requirement of reasonableness to avoid invalidation for indefi-
niteness, but argued that once the perpetuities issue was injected the court
could not make this construction to avoid violation of the Rule. The dissent,
following this reasoning, considers that the majority has disregarded
settled rules by making the result depend on reasonable probabilities rather
than on the possibility of non-completion which existed at the time the
interest was created. If the majority is merely examining the contingent
event, deciding that reasonable probabilities show that the event should
occur within twenty-one years, and therefore imposing a condition of
reasonable time, then, as the dissent implies, the California Code has been
effectively amended by the judiciary to require vesting if at all within
twenty-one years unless the court decides to impose this condition not
contemplated by the parties. The court does have impressive authority,
however, for the proposition that a document should be construed if
possible to avoid a violation of the Rule 19 and the majority could properly
consider this construction of reasonable time to provide another exception
to the Rule along with possibilities of reverter, rights of entry, and result-
17 Gray, op. cit. supra note 14, § 629.
18 Since leases are generally bilateral contracts as well as conveyances of a prop-
erty interest, the rules of construction relating to contracts apply. Corbin, Contracts
§ 686 (1960); Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. of Los Angeles v. Horton & Converse, 21
Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d 457 (1942).
19 Restatement, Property § 375 (1944); 6 American Law of Property § 24.45
(Casner ed. 1952) ; 3 Simes & Smith, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1288.
[Vol. 25
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ing trusts. If the majority is merely looking to the event, they have
created an exception. to the Rule, but a highly justifiable one when the
nature of the interest is considered.
There is, however, an alternative rationale which preserves the tradi-
tional application of the Rule. If the court considers its operation to include
ascertaining the intent of the parties and finds that the intent was to have
completion within a reasonable time, then that time element has always
been a part of the lease, just as if the parties had expressly stipulated
completion within twenty-one years. Once a requirement of reasonable
time is found the court must look to the reasonable probabilities of com-
pletion in order to interpret the duration of a reasonable time. Since the
parties have excluded unreasonable probabilities by their lease, the Rule
can be "remorselessly applied" without voiding the interest. This analysis
eliminates any exception to the Rule and the subtle difference depends on
whether the court looks to the intention of the parties or uses the objective
method and examines the event 2 0
The next question is: to what kind of transactions can the construction
of reasonableness be applied? When trustees have been given discretion as
to the time of distribution of the res, the courts have construed a require-
ment of reasonable time.21 The construction has been used where the
settlor gave a general direction to the trustee to sell property after an
indefinite period of time.2 2 A construction of reasonableness has been used
where a leasehold for the removal of timber was to commence at any time
the lessee might desire.2 3 The cases have this much in common: the court
is in a position to control the contingent event because it is controllable
by one of the parties. The trustee is subject to a surcharge if he fails to
perform the duty within a reasonable time and the lessor or lessee is sub-
ject to damages for breach if he fails to perform within a reasonable time.
The court can control the result by manipulating remedies. Since the event
must be subject to control by one of the parties, this would eliminate a
lease from A to B, the term to commence when X constructs a building on
some other premises, X being a stranger to the parties. This is analogous
to an aleatory contract and the fortuitous event, because not subject to the
control of one of the parties, is therefore not controllable by the court. The
construction of reasonableness does not belong in this example even if the
parties intended X to construct within a reasonable time.2 4
20 This distinction between objective and subjective analysis may be considered
highly nebulous since in practice decision is probably dependent on both, and there is
little judicial review. For some of the problems in interpretation when no time limit
for performance is stated, see Corbin, Contracts § 553 (1960).
21 Myers v. Hardin, 208 Ark. 505, 186 S.W2d 925 (1945); Brandenburg. v.
Thorndike, 139 Mass. 102, 28 N.E. 575 (1885).
22 Smith v. Renne, 382 Ill. 26, 46 N.E2d 587 (1943); Harrison v. Kamp, 395
Ill. 11, 69 N.E.2d 261 (1946).
23 Kirkland v. Odum, 156 Ga. 131, 118 S.E. 706 (1923) ; Gex v. Dill, 86 Miss. 10,
38 So. 193 (1905).
24 This analysis should apply to options to purchase when a specific time has not
been expressed, since the occurance of the contingent event is within the discretion
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The plaintiff also argued that even with the construction of reason-
ableness, the interest might vest beyond the period of the Rule because
the defendant might fail to construct the building in time and the plaintiff
might waive the breach. The court wisely rejected the argument, pointing
out that this would be possible even if there were an express provision
limiting completion to twenty-one years. Every event which is dependent
on the duty of a party is subject to some form of waiver and to assume
that parties are willing to enforce their rights is only proper. The interests
which would be void under a contrary assumption would be preposter-
ously numerous.
The policy underlying the Rule has not been universally agreed upon,
but there is some accord that its purpose is to promote alienability and
hence to make property more productive.25 The conflict appears to center on
the application of the Rule and whether it is aimed at remoteness of vesting
or inalienability. 26 If alienation to third parties were the primary policy,
then there might be a practical barrier in persuading the lessor and lessee
to join in a conveyance in fee and also in evaluating the lessee's interest r
If the basic policy, however, is not to promote marketability per se but
to facilitate productive use of the land, then the Rule should not be applied
in this area. The reasons for this can be found in an analogous situation,
the option to renew a lease or an option to purchase contained in a lease.
A provision of this sort is valid even though it creates an equitable con-
tingent interest which may last beyond the period of the Rule.28 This
apparent exception to the Rule can only be explained on a policy basis.
Without the option, the lessee would be inhibited in making improve-
ments to the land because the benefits of such improvements would accrue
to the lessor and not the lessee. 29 The option makes the lease more attrac-
tive to the purchaser and therefore promotes alienation rather than im-
peding it,3° and encourages full use of the land once the lessee takes
possession. In the option situation the beneficial results accrue to the lessee,
of the optionee and could be controlled by the court. A further reason for application
here is that we are squarely within the realm of contracts where a reasonable time
construction is commonplace. The problems are more manifest with leases because of
the mixed elements of contract and property law. Before the construction of reason-
ableness is used, it should be necessary to find mutual covenants in order to set the
proper stage for contract rules, but in this case the promise to pay rent and the
promise to construct are clearly mutual.
25 Simes, "The Policy Against Perpetuities," 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707, 710 (1955).
26 Simes resolves this conflict, id. at 711-712, and then later in the article con-
tends that the productive policy is outmoded by present conditions and believes it is
actually a policy against dead hand control. Gray, who espoused the remoteness argu-
ment in application, agrees that the actual policy is to promote marketability by char-
acterizing the Rule as "forwarding the circulation of property," Gray, op. cit. supra
note 14, § 2.1.
27 47 Calif. L. Rev. 197 n. 6 (1959).
28 Restatement, Property § 395 (1944) ; 6 American Law of Property § 24.57
(Casner ed. 1952).
29 Leach, "Perpetuities in a Nutshell," 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 661 (1938).
30 Simes & Smith, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1243.
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but in the present transaction the lessor acquires the advantage. Without
the lease, the lessor would be more than hesitant to commence any con-
struction, but once a market is insured through the "on completion" lease,
construction will be forthcoming. The property has been improved and
is now more productive.31 Instead of a removal of property from the
commercial stream there has been an addition unless removal is equated
with the failure to convey a fee simple. Such a restricted definition would
relegate the Rule to nothing more than a farce, with the policy consider-
ation being to sell, merely to be selling. If the chief policy is the productivity
or improvement theory, the present transaction is extremely foreign
to the Rule and should be categorized as another exception along with
options to renew and purchase contained in leases. Although the court
reached the proper result, by placing the present transaction in the main-
stream of the Rule, it permits further contentions; the more dispositive
approach would have been not to apply the Rule.
32
31 Leach, supra note 5, at 1319.
32 This case is also noted in 9 Vill. L. Rev. 545 (1964), where it is advocated
that the Rule should not apply to commercial transactions since the rules pertaining
to restraints on alienation are capable of preventing any fettering of iiterests.
